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Introduction
After peaking in the early 1990s, official measures of violent and property crime rates dropped to levels not seen since the 1960s. Proportional declines in the most serious offenses have been particularly pronounced. For example, murders/manslaughter per 100,000 declined by more than half, from 9.8 in 1991 to 4.5 in 2014, the lowest recorded murder rate since 1960. The violent crime rate overall fell by approximately half over this period while overall property crime rates fell by nearly 50 percent. Juxtaposed against this declining crime rate has been an enormous and unprecedented expansion in U.S. correctional populations. Between 1980 and 2013, the prison incarceration rate increased nearly 3.5 times, the jail incarceration rate increased by nearly three times, while the community correction supervision rate (numbers of people on probation or parole per 100,000) increase by 2.6 times. By 2013, roughly 3 percent of the adult population in the United States was under some form of criminal justice supervision. Over this time period, the U.S. transitioned from a nation with an incarceration rate slightly higher than that of western European nations to the nation with the highest incarceration rate in the world.
These two coinciding trends present a provocative contrast illustrating the conflicting manner in which changes in crime and punishment over the past few decades have impacted socioeconomic inequality in the United States. As we will show, crime rates declined the most in poorer more minority cities, and within cities, in the poorest neighborhoods. In other words, the benefits of the crime decline have been progressively distributed. By contrast, the social costs created by the unprecedented expansion in correctional populations have been regressively distributed, with poor disproportionately minority males (African-American males in particular) being most directly impacted and poor minority families (again African-American families in particular) disproportionately bearing the collateral social costs of the stiffening of U.S. sentencing policy.
There is an ongoing debate on the extent to which the rise in incarceration and the extended reach of the criminal justice system drove recent declines in crime. There is fairly strong evidence for the U.S. and other nations of sizable effects of incarceration on crime operating largely through physical incapacitation. These effects, however, diminish with scale as expanding the use of incarceration along the intensive margin tends to incarcerated individuals into advanced ages when the propensity to offend declines while expansions along the extensive margin tends to net less criminally active individuals.
There is less evidence that the more extensive use of probation and the increased propensity of courts across the country to levy fines and fees on those convicted of serious and less serious criminal offenses have contributed to crime declines.
In what follows we document both the disproportion incidence of the decline in crime as well as the increase in criminal justice sanctioning and involvement born by poor and minority communities.
We argue that the coincidence of these two trends do not necessarily support the contention that one has caused the other. In particular, the crime decline commencing in the early 1990s is observed in other countries that have not greatly expanded the scope and reach of their criminal justice systems.
Moreover, while increases in incarceration during the 1980s likely suppressed peak crime rates in the early 1990s, the crime decline corresponds to a period of rapid growth in incarceration levels for which there is little evidence of an appreciable impact on crime. Finally, the recent experiences of several states with reducing incarceration suggest that the contribution of higher incarceration rates to crime abatement is limited at current levels. The experience of California where the state was forced by a federal court to reduce its incarceration rate to 1990 levels is particularly instructive. In the conclusion, we argue that public policy can and should pursue both ongoing reductions in crime and in the inequality of crime victimization, as well as simultaneously seeking to reduce the inequality of criminal justice sanctioning.
Inequality in criminal victimization
There are two principal sources of crime data in the United States. First, the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provides counts of crimes known to the police by month and crime type. Second, the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) provide crime rate estimates based on an annual household survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Crime rates tabulated from the NCVS tend to be higher than those tabulated from the UCR due to under-reporting of crimes to the police. In addition, there are notable differences in trend estimates from these two data sources. For example during the 1970s and 1980s, the NCVS shows overall decreases in crime while crime rates as measured by the UCR increase substantially.
2 In recent years trends in these two data sources tend to align. Both suggest increase in serious violent crime during the 1980s. As we will soon see, both show very pronounced declines in crime and victimization since the early 1990s. The simultaneous analysis of these two data sources permits a more complete picture of how crime/victimization risk varies with socioeconomic characteristics.
Figure 1 presents rates of violent and property crime, both expressed as the number of incidents per 100,000 people, from the UCR for the period 1980 through 2013. The violent crime rate is the sum of murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults per 100,000 residents. Property crime rates are the number of burglaries, motor vehicle thefts, and larceny thefts per 100,000 residents. These seven felony crimes (often referred to as the FBI's "part 1" felony offenses) provide the standard categorization of serious offenses in the United States. Both series show peaks in 1991. While there are some doubts about whether UCR-measured increase in property crime during the late 1980s captures an actual rise in crime or trends in crime reporting by both victims and agencies participating in the UCR (Boggess and Bound 1997) , the increase in serious violent crime-and homicide in particularbeginning around 1985 is a well-documented fact (Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998) . Figure 1 also reveals 4 very large declines in crime rates from 1991 on. Violent crime rates dropped by more than half over this period, while property crime rates fell by nearly half. As we will see shortly, victimization statistics reveal very similar overall patterns.
One cannot use the historical data from the Uniform Crime Reports to explore in a direct way how crime rates as experienced by different socioeconomic groups have changed over time. For the most part, the data are summarized at the law enforcement agency level with little micro-level information on specific criminal incidents. 3 However, police agencies tend to correspond geographically with incorporated cities, and cities vary considerably with respect to average socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Hence, one can assess the incidence of the crime decline by examining the relationship between changes in crime rates across cities with different socioeconomic characteristics.
Figures 2 and 3 present such an analysis for the years 1990 and 2008 based on the data set produced by Kneebone and Raphael (2011) . The data describe crime rates and demographic characteristics for the roughly 5,400 cities located within the nation's 100 largest US metropolitan areas. Property crime rates and violent crime rates are notably higher in cities where a higher proportion of residents are African-American in both years. In addition crime rates are declining across all deciles. However, the figure reveals larger absolute drops in cities with proportionally larger African- For each census tract, we use the data from Cohen and Gorr (2001) property crime is also skewed towards poorer more minority census tracts, the geographic incidence of this decline is more even across the city's neighborhoods. limited within-city analysis. Victimization rates decline sharply for all race/ethnic groups. However, the absolute and relative declines are largest for African-Americans and Hispanics. Given the average income differentials and differences in poverty rates between whites, Hispanics, and African-Americans, these results strongly indicate that lower income households experienced disproportionately large reductions in criminal victimization since the beginning of the crime decline. 5 The crime decline since the early 1990s has also considerably narrowed the difference in crime rates between the national central cities and suburbs. See Kneebone and Raphael (2011) .
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The most pronounced disparities in criminal victimization in the United States are found in homicide rates. There are enormous inter-racial disparities in homicide, with very strong interactions between gender and age. While these disparities are evident in all years with recorded data (O'Flaherty and Sethi 2010), they change drastically over time with shocks to drug markets and broader trends in crime rates. In 2008, the black homicide rate of 19.6 per 100,000 was nearly six times the white homicide rate (3.3 per 100,000). In 1991, at the peak of the run-up in black in homicide rates beginning in 1986, the black homicide rate of 39.4 per 100,000 was over seven times that of the white homicide rate of 5.6 per 100,000. Figure 5 shows homicide rates for white and black males for three age groupings: 14 to 17 years of age, 18 to 24 years of age, and 25 and older. Several notable patterns emerge. First, homicide rates for black males 18 to 24 years of age are extraordinarily high in all years, reaching nearly 200 per 100,000 in the early 1990s and then declining to 91 per 100,000 in 2008.
Second, homicide rates in all ranges for black males exceed homicide rates for white males. Third, since the early 1990s black male homicide rates have fallen dramatically, falling by half for males 18 and over and by over 60 percent for 14 to 17 year-old black males. White male homicide rates also dropped by roughly 40 to 50 percent, but from a much lower base.
Despite the decline in homicide rates since 1991, the homicide rates currently experienced by black males in the United States remain stunningly high. Understanding and addressing the high homicide rates for African-American males constitutes one of the most important criminal justice problems faced by the United States.
Inequality in the incidence of the direct and indirect costs of punishment
The operation of the US criminal justice system is costly. For example, Anderson (2012) estimates annual US criminal justice expenditures circa 2010 of roughly $113 billion on police, $81 billion on corrections, $76 billion in expenditure by various federal agencies, and $84 billion devoted to 9 combating drug trafficking. Beyond expenditures, criminal justice enforcement imposes costs on those convicted of crimes, their family members, and their communities. Some of these social costs are the direct and intended result of punishment, while others are indirect and unintended. For example, the forced removal from non-institutionalized society associated with incarceration or the restrictions on liberties associated with a probation term are the direct and intended consequences. 6 The material deprivation of family members associated with losing an adult earner represent costs that are indirect and unintended. The prevalence and magnitude of these hard-to-measure direct and indirect social costs have increased and in an unequal manner over the past four decades. This has disproportionately affected poor minority communities, and in particular African-American men.
Before proceeding, a few institutional definitions regarding US corrections practices are in order.
"Prisons" generally house those who are convicted of felonies and sentenced to serve at least one year.
"Jails" house individuals awaiting arraignment and or trial or who are sentenced to relatively short incarceration spells. Many who are convicted of both felonies and misdemeanors are sentenced to probation in lieu of incarceration, or sometimes in combination with a short jail sentence. Individuals on probation are monitored in the community with the degrees of stringency often depending on risk assessments conducted by local probation departments. Probation may be revoked for non-compliance with the conditions of probation, a legal action that can result in a jail or prison term. increase in drug arrest rates starting in the mid-1980s that has been sustained through the present.
Second, conditional on being arrested for a crime the likelihood of being admitted to prison has increased for all offenses, especially those offenses for which the likelihood of being admitted to prison conditional on an arrest was low in years past (Neal and Rick 2015; Raphael and Stoll 2013; Travis and Western 2014) . Third, effective sentence lengths (i.e., ultimate time served) within crime categories have gotten longer Stoll 2009, 2013; Neal and Rick 2015; Travis and Western 2014) . This is especially true for the most serious crimes with a high likelihood of being admitted to prison upon conviction, such as murder robbery, or rape/sexual assault. However, this is also observed for less serious crimes. Finally, nearly all of the growth since 1980 can be explained by tougher sentences involving both more frequent use of prisons to punish felony offenses, as well as longer expected time served either conditional on conviction (Neal and Rick 2015) or conditional on prison admission (Raphael and Stoll 2013) .
These changes have greatly expanded the reach of the criminal justice system, such that the proportion of American residents involved with the criminal justice system has reached historic highs. The use of fines and fees has increased in recent years. The best work on this topic is presented in Harris, Evans, and Beckett (2010 Beckett and Harris (2011) and Harris, Evans and Beckett (2011) . Nagin (2008) provides a thoughtful discussion of the potential role of fines and fees in the US criminal justice system as an alternative sanction to incarceration, with attention to the implementation details, coordination requirements, and ethical tradeoffs. In addition, Ruback and Bergstrom (2006) provide a review of research on fines, fees, and restitutions and a discussion of the more systematic use of fines in western European countries.
convicted felons with fines imposed at sentencing from 0.11 to 0.34. In addition, the proportion with outstanding restitution orders increases from 0.11 to 0.25. The authors also find that for convicted felons sentenced to jail rather than prison, or probation rather than prison or jail, the incidence of fines imposed at sentencing increases nearly threefold.
The authors also analyze administrative data on sentences imposed by Washington state superior courts in the first two months of 2004, a period of time where roughly 3,000 felony sentences were handed down. In addition to estimating mean and median monetary sanctions for these sentences, the authors randomly selected 500 individuals and cumulated lifetime monetary sanctions (including those imposed through juvenile courts) through the year 2008. The monetary sanctions exhibit great variability within offense category, and tend to be largest for drug felonies. This analysis revealed that many who are convicted of felony offenses carry substantial arrearages, and pay them off very slowly. They estimate that the median outstanding debt amounts to roughly half the likely annual earnings of the individuals impacted, while the mean balance is equal to a full year of potential earnings.
Money is fungible. When fines and fees are imposed as part of a criminal prosecution, at least some of the financial burden will devolve on to the household of the person involved with the criminal justice system. When someone who is involved in the criminal justice system has reduced employment prospects, some of those financial costs will again be born by others in their household. We have said nothing about the family resources devoted to replenishing inmate commissary accounts, the devotion of household resources to prison phone calls, time devoted to visiting family members and the other manners by which a family member's involvement with the criminal justice system may tax a household's resources. To our knowledge, aggregate data on such costs do not exist.
The criminal justice expansion and the decline in crime
We have documented unprecedented shifts in both crime and punishment. Crime rates have declined considerably since the early 1990s, and in a manner such that the benefits of this decline are quite progressively distributed. On the other hand, criminal sanctioning has become considerably more severe, with the direct and indirect impacts of this increased severity being regressively distributed. The juxtaposition of these two trends begs questions concerning what is driving the decline in crime and whether current punishment practices are necessary for maintaining currently low crime rates.
What caused the decline in US crime rates starting around 1991? There are a myriad of theories, but no smoking-gun explanation for these phenomenal changes. One body of research has focused on US time-series and cross-state evidence, both on changes in criminal justice policies and also on demographic and other factors that could have affected crime rates. However, a complicating factor is that many other western high-income countries with drastically different criminal justice systems have experienced a fall in crime rates since the 1990s, which suggests that discussions of cause and effect focused on distinctively American crime-enforcement policies and social events may be missing some important causal factors.
In the US-focused literature on the decline of rates of crime, among the many explanations that have been offered and evaluated by researchers are the general aging of the population (Levitt 2004; Baumer and Wolff 2014) , a delayed effect of the legalization of abortion (Donohue and Levitt 2001; 2003, Foot and Goetz 2005) , lower blood-lead levels among successive birth cohorts associated with the removal of lead from gasoline and paint (Rick 2000 (Rick , 2007 Reyes 2012) , technological innovations that have made it more difficult to steal, especially locking systems in new cars (Farrell, Tilley. and Tseloni 2014) , higher police staffing levels (Chalfin and McCrary forthcoming), innovative policing strategies (Braga and Bond 2008; Weisburd et. al 2010 , Zimring 2007 , an increase in the deployment of private security guards MacDonald 2010, 2011 ) the waning of the crack cocaine epidemic (Fryer et. al 16 2013) , and the enormous rise of US incarceration rates (Levitt 1996; Liedke, Piehl, and Useem 2006; Raphael and Stoll 2013; Lofstrom and Raphael 2015) . In an earlier assessment of the contribution of these factors in this journal, Levitt (2004) argues that nearly all of the US crime decline since 1991 can be explained by four factors: the legalization of abortion, the waning of the crack epidemic, the rise in the US incarceration rate, and the increase in police staffing levels.
All of these hypothesized factors remain active areas of research. Here, we will focus in particular on the possible linkage from incarceration to crime. As noted in the introduction, those who benefit most from the reduction in crime and those who are most likely to be incarcerated both come from the poorest communities in the country. Thus, the question arises as to the extent to which these communities face a tradeoff between lower crime rates and higher incarceration rates.
Before discussing specific research on the relationship between incarceration and crime, it is intriguing to note that other high-income countries have experienced a similar fall in crime rates without much change in their criminal justice enforcement or incarceration patterns. Zimring (2006 Zimring ( , 2007 has noted the remarkable similarities between crime trends in the United States and Canada. Canada's property crime rate peaks in 1991 at 6,160 incidents per 100,000 before declining to 2,342 in 2013.
Canada's violent crime rate peaked at 1,084 incidents per 100,000 before declining to a rate of 766 in 2013. 9 However, Canada's overall incarceration rate exhibits comparatively little variation. The incarceration rate inclusive of pre-trial detainees (referred to as those on remand) in 2013 stood at 139 per 100,000, 10 slightly higher than years past, but slightly less than one-fifth the comparable rate for the United States in 2013. Tonry (2014) and Farrell, Tilly, and Tseloni (2014) provide further comparisons to mostly western European nations. While the timing of crime peaks and declines differ somewhat across countries, they observe substantial declines in violent crime, and lethal violence in particular, throughout Western Europe, with the timing of the declines in the United Kingdom most similar to crime trends in the United States. Taking a longer historical view, Eisner (2001 Eisner ( , 2008 Eisner ( , 2014 argues that criminal violence and lethal violence in particular have declined considerably and almost continuously since the thirteenth century AD. From this long-run perspective, the increase in violent crime throughout the western world beginning in the mid-1960s appears to be an aberration from a longerterm historical trend, with the downward trend resuming in the 1990s (Eisner 2008) . Note, incarceration rates in Western European countries are more in line with Canadian rates and a fraction of the incarceration rates in the United States.
The comparable declines in crime in other nations raise questions regarding deeper forces in western societies that are tending towards lower offending levels and casts some doubt on the claims that the specific criminal justice policy choices made in the United States are the key in explaining the crime declines. That being said, there is considerable heterogeneity across US states and cities in criminal justice practices and changes therein as well as ample and sometimes discrete policy variation in many national settings that permit well-identified study of the determinants of crime rates within nations. Moreover, there are important differences in either timing and/or magnitude of the US crime decline compared with the declines observed in other countries, suggesting that while the US experience may reflect broader trends in criminality worldwide, there are factors that are specific to United States or to other specific countries that certainly merit consideration.
Levitt's 2004 review of the crime decline attributes one-third of the decline to increases in incarceration during the 1990s. This assessment was based largely on research studying the incarceration-crime relationship using data spanning the late 1970s, 1980s, and very early 1990s
(specifically, the estimates in Levitt 1996) . Since the publication of Levitt's (2004) assessment, there have been several quasi-experimental studies of the prison crime relationship exploiting large, discrete, and policy-induced changes in incarceration rates in the U.S. and elsewhere. There have also been advances in panel data estimates that explore the possibility of diminishing marginal effectiveness of incarceration as a crime-fighting tool. This research indeed demonstrates that at relatively low incarceration rates, exogenous shocks to incarceration levels tend to have fairly large effects on crime, mostly through criminal incapacitation. However, this research also shows very small effects of changes in incarceration rates on crime when the incarceration rate is high-and evidence of diminishing effectiveness sets in at relatively low levels of incarceration. In Lofstrom and Raphael (2016) , we look at a recent policy shock to California. In October 2011, the state implemented sentencing reforms under pressure from a federal court order that greatly These state-level panel data studies can be used to tabulate the contribution of expanded prison populations to declines in crime since the early 1990s. The estimates in Raphael and Stoll (2013) suggest that at most 7 percent of the decline in property crime since 1990 can be attributed to incarceration growth and none of the decline in violent crime. The larger estimates for the 1980s, however, suggest that had the prison population not expanding between 1975 and 1989, the property and violent crime peaks in the early 1990s would have been roughly one-third higher.
These studies suggest that drawing conclusions about how changes in incarceration rates will affect crime must keep the context of the study in mind. The collective clemency in Italy is obviously different from California's sentencing reforms, which were focused on limiting the use of prison for technical parole violations and less serious crimes, which in turn were different from the policy change of enhancing sentences for career criminals in Netherlands. It can't be assumed that levels or changes incarceration rates or sentencing practices in one country will have similar effects in other countries with different institutions and history. In addition, changes in incarceration seems to have diminishing returns on crime, and thus it seems reasonable to argue that the rise in incarceration through the 1970s and into the 1980s may have had a substantial effect in reducing US crime rates, while simultaneously arguing that much of the growth in US incarceration rates since 1990 appears to have had little impact on crime.
Conclusion
The burdens of criminal victimization and criminal justice enforcement have changed drastically in the United States over the past three decades. Crime rates have fallen to historical lows since the 22 early 1990s with much larger absolute declines in relatively poor and minority communities. At the same time, the reach of the criminal justice system has greatly expanded. This predates the decline in crime by nearly a decade and a half, with prison incarceration rates and other correctional population departing from historical levels in the mid-1970s. However, this expansion accelerates in the early 1990s. In recent years, correctional populations have receded somewhat, due to selective reforms in a handful of states. However, incarceration rates, probation and parole populations, and the population of former prisoners and convicted felons among the non-institutionalized remains at historical highs.
Similar to the incidence of victimization, the distribution across demographic groups of criminal justice involvement is highly skewed towards low-income households, less educated men, and African
Americans. The great expansion in the scope and intensity of criminal sanctions has been born disproportionately by these groups.
It is certainly the case that on average criminal justice supervision of various severities deters and incapacitates and that the increases in incarceration through the early 1990s suppressed crime rates at the peak, perhaps considerably. However, the vast expansions occurring during the 1990s and during the first few years of the new century have bought little in terms of crime reduction but imposed substantial costs on the sanctioned, their families, and their communities.
Many of the same low-income predominantly African American communities have disproportionately experienced both the welcome reduction in inequality for crime victims and the lesswelcome rise in inequality due to changes in criminal justice sanctioning. While it is tempting to consider whether these two changes in inequality can be weighed and balanced against each other, it seems to us that this temptation should be resisted on both theoretical and practical ground. On theoretical grounds, the case for reducing inequality of any type is always rooted in claims about fairness and justice. In some situations, several different claims about inequality can be combined into a single scale-for example, when such claims can be monetized or measured in terms of income. But the 23 inequality of the suffering of crime victims is fundamentally different from the inequality of disproportionate criminal justice sanctioning, and cannot be compared on the same scale. In practical terms, while higher rates of incarceration and other criminal justice sanctions may have had some effect in reducing crime back in the 1970s and through the 1980s, there is little evidence to believe that the higher rates have caused the reduction in crime in the last two decades. Thus, it is reasonable to pursue multiple policy goals, both seeking additional reductions in crime and in the continuing inequality of crime victimization and simultaneously seeking to reduce inequality of criminal justice sanctioning. If such policies are carried out sensibly, both kinds of inequality can be reduced without a meaningful tradeoff arising between them. Population data from the 2000 Census summary tape files 1 and 3A. Crime data from Cohen and Gorr (2006) .
